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Abstract
We show that welfare can be lower under complete financial markets than under autarky
in a monetary union with home bias, sticky prices and asymmetric shocks. Such a mone-
tary union is a second-best environment in which the structure of financial markets affects
risk-sharing but also shapes the dynamics of inflation rates and the welfare costs from nom-
inal rigidities. Welfare reversals arise for a variety of empirically plausible degrees of price
stickiness when the Marshall-Lerner condition is met. These results carry over a model with
active fiscal policies, and hold within a medium-scale model, although to a weaker extent.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we compare welfare under alternative financial market structures in a monetary
union with country-specific shocks, sticky prices, and home bias. What we have in mind is the
achievement of monetary unification in Europe, often regarded as part of a process of integrating
goods and financial markets. In particular, the integration of financial markets has long been
considered to be a crucial condition to foster the adoption of a common currency. The idea dates
back to the contributions of Ingram [1969] and Mundell [1973], and places financial markets,
and their ability to provide full insurance against country-specific shocks, at the heart of the
definition of optimum currency areas. Our main result is that, in a second-best environment such
as a monetary union with sticky prices, complete financial markets do not necessarily deliver a
higher level of welfare compared to financial autarky. In this environment, complete markets
produce welfare gains from risk-sharing compared to financial autarky, but can also generate
larger welfare costs from nominal rigidities. This negative effect on welfare can overturn the
gains from risk-sharing and invert the usual ranking of welfare. The result holds true for a wide
range of empirically plausible parameter values and is robust to various policy configurations.
In our view, it relates to and complements the recent results of Farhi and Werning [2013], who
show that agents do not acquire the socially optimal level of insurance in a monetary union with
sticky prices, even when financial markets are complete.
We lay out a simple two-country model of a monetary union with two goods and sticky prices,
following Benigno [2004]. We add home bias in private consumption, as in Pappa and Vassi-
latos [2007], and consider a non-unitary trade elasticity to analyze the welfare implications of
alternative financial markets structures.1 In open economy models, complete financial markets
allow for international borrowing and risk-sharing among households of different countries. In
particular, the real exchange rate moves to ensure the equalization of relative marginal utili-
ties of consumption. Imposing financial autarky introduces a tighter link between income and
consumption, i.e. wealth effects, and generally yields welfare losses with respect to perfect
risk-sharing. In two-country models with two goods and home bias, when goods are substi-
tutes (respectively complements) in utility, perfect risk-sharing requires larger (resp. smaller)
expenditure-switching effects with respect to financial autarky to provide insurance over rela-
tive marginal utilities of consumptions, an outcome achieved by having larger (resp. smaller)
fluctuations in the real exchange rate (see de Paoli [2009]).
Under flexible exchange rates, with flexible prices or optimal national price stability policies, this
result implies that the nominal exchange rate is more (resp. less) volatile under complete markets
1With a unitary trade elasticity, allocations under different financial market structures coincide. Our analysis
therefore has to proceed with a non-unitary trade elasticity.
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than under autarky when goods are substitutes (resp. complements) in utility. With a fixed
exchange rate or within a monetary union, the volatility pattern applies to the terms of trade, not
the nominal exchange rate. When prices are flexible, welfare is not affected by these differences
in terms-of-trade volatility. However, when prices are sticky, due to the lack of monetary policy
instruments, national inflation rates cannot be fully stabilized. In this second-best environment,
alternative financial market structures also shape the welfare costs from nominal rigidities. We
show that, when goods are substitutes in utility, i.e. when the trade elasticity is larger than
one, equilibria under complete financial markets result in larger variations of terms of trade
compared to financial autarky, thus in more volatile national inflation rates, producing larger
welfare costs from nominal rigidities. The latter may end-up overturning the welfare gains from
a better sharing of risks. We uncover a large set of empirically realistic parameter values that
produce welfare reversals, cases where welfare is lower under complete financial markets than
under financial autarky. In particular, this is the case when the degree of price stickiness lies
in the range of standard empirical estimates and the trade elasticity is above one but not too
large.
Extending the baseline model to consider active public spending policies, we also investigate
the extent to which the occurrence of welfare reversals can be affected by fiscal policies.2 With
active fiscal policies and more policy instruments, a monetary union could get closer to a first-
best environment. As in Gal´ı and Monacelli [2008] or Pappa and Vassilatos [2007] however, this is
not the case as public spending enters as an argument of the utility function of households. Active
fiscal policies require deviations from the efficient provision of public good, creating a trade-off
between the benefits from stabilization, and the welfare costs implied by public spending gaps.
We show that none of the policy arrangements considered, including a fully optimal – Ramsey –
policy changes the prediction that welfare reversals can arise for empirically plausible parameter
values.
Lastly, we conduct an extensive robustness exercise and compare welfare under complete and
incomplete financial markets within a medium-scale model a` la Smets and Wouters [2003]. The
model includes external habit in consumption, capital accumulation with adjustment costs, a
variable utilization rate, sticky prices and sticky wages, as well as price and wage indexation.
Our main result is robust to many of the additional assumptions made in the Smets and Wouters
[2003] model. However, price indexation, sticky wages, as well as the specific shock structure
with high reliance on preference shocks can change our main result. Price indexation lowers
the welfare costs from nominal rigidities by reducing producer price dispersion, and increases
2Our model also shares some of the features of models analyzing the joint design of fiscal and monetary policy
in a monetary union, such as Beetsma and Jensen [2005], Ferrero [2009], Gal´ı and Monacelli [2008] and Hjortsø
[2013].
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the relative importance of welfare gains from perfect risk-sharing. Wage stickiness significantly
lowers the sensitivity of wages and labor supply to fluctuations, and attenuates the strength
of cross-country wealth effects. Finally, the overwhelming importance of preference shocks im-
posed by the Smets and Wouters [2003] framework and calibration affects the welfare ranking of
alternative financial market structures. The structure of shocks chosen to represent the business
cycle is therefore important in shaping welfare reversal areas.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that is solved analytically
to derive qualitative results about the volatility of terms of trade and inflation rates under
alternative financial market structures. We also run numerical experiments to assess the extent
of welfare reversals depending on key parameter values. Finally, we investigate the robustness
of welfare reversals to a variety of stabilization policies. Section 3 questions the sensitivity of
welfare reversals to the various assumptions and driving forces considered in a medium-scale
monetary union model a` la Smets and Wouters [2003]. Section 4 concludes.
2 A stylized monetary union model
2.1 Model highlights
We lay out a simple model of a monetary union with two regions of identical size, the home
country and the foreign country.3 In each region there is a representative household maximizing
a welfare index that depends on the path of the log of consumption and on the path of hours
worked. Optimization gives rise to a labor supply condition and to a standard Euler equation.
The structure of financial markets can either consist in complete markets where agents hold a
portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities that are traded before policy choices are made (see Senay
and Sutherland (2007, 2011)), producing a state-contingent return and allowing for perfect risk-
sharing, or consist in financial autarky. Under autarky, terms of trade adjust to induce a zero
trade balance each period and a zero trade balance condition replaces the risk-sharing condition.
There are two goods in the economy, one produced in each country, made of local varieties.
Both goods are imperfectly substitutable with elasticity of substitution µ > 0, and households’
preferences are biased towards local goods. We denote (1− α) ∈ [1/2, 1] as the share of goods
produced locally in the consumption bundle of households. In each country there is a unit
continuum of firms producing varieties of each type of good with labor using a linear production
function affected by exogenous productivity shocks. Price contacts are set according to Calvo
[1983], and the law of one price holds. Considering that governments optimally offset steady-state
mark-ups and assuming a symmetric degree of price stickiness, the model implies the following
3The detailed model is described in Appendix A.1.
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linearized Phillips curves governing inflation dynamics for Producer Price Indices (PPIs) in each
region:
π̂h,t = βEtπ̂h,t+1 + κ (ψŷt + ĉt + αŝt − (1 + ψ) ât) (1)
π̂f,t = βEtπ̂f,t+1 + κ (ψŷ
∗
t + ĉ
∗
t − αŝt − (1 + ψ) â
∗
t ) (2)
where the term under brackets is the real marginal cost. Labor leisure choices have been used
to substitute for real wages and then production functions have been used to eliminate hours
worked. In Equations (1)-(2), π̂h,t = p̂h,t− p̂h,t−1 and π̂f,t = p̂f,t− p̂f,t−1 are domestic and foreign
PPI inflation rates, hats denote the log of variables and stars characterize foreign variables.
Further, ŷ is the log of output, ĉ is the log of consumption, ŝ = p̂f − p̂h denotes the relative
price of the foreign good, i.e. the terms of trade, and â is the log of labor productivity, following
an autoregressive process with iid innovations. Further, κ = (1− η) (1− βη) /η where β is the
discount factor and η the index of price stickiness, ψ−1 is the Frisch elasticity on labor supply
and α captures the steady-state share of imports in consumption. These Phillips curves are fairly
standard, in that a higher degree of price stickiness gives more relative weight to the forward
component of inflation, a higher level of output pushes inflation up while higher productivity
levels lower inflation. Consumptions appear in the Phillips curves because the marginal utility of
consumption affects labor supply. All else equal, a decrease in the marginal utility of consumption
lowers labor supply, which exerts an upward pressure on wages, resulting in positive inflation.
Finally, terms of trade ŝ play an important role in the dynamics of the model. They appear
in Phillips curves because households supply labor based on nominal wages deflated by the
Consumption Price Index (CPI) while firms demand labor based on wages deflated by the PPI.
These so-called terms-of-trade spillovers on labor supply play an important role, as they are
part of the transmission of terms-of-trade fluctuations to inflation rates.
In a monetary union with only one policy instrument, a common central bank can stabilize union-
wide inflation but is unable to stabilize relative inflation rates, and cannot implement the flexible
price equilibrium (see Benigno [2004]). This policy trade-off is specific to a monetary union with
sticky prices and asymmetric shocks, and makes it a second-best environment. Following Benigno
[2004], we assume that the central bank follows the optimal monetary policy that fully stabilizes
union-wide inflation
π̂t + π̂
∗
t = π̂h,t + π̂f,t = 0 (3)
and union-wide allocations are just
ŷt + ŷ
∗
t = ĉt + ĉ
∗
t = ât + â
∗
t (4)
where we substituted the union-wide goods market clearing condition in the union-wide Phillips
curve. This relation holds under both complete asset markets and financial autarky. Hence the
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structure of financial markets affects relative variables only. Further, combining both Phillips
curves determines the dynamics of terms of trade through
π̂rt = βEtπ̂
r
t+1 + κ (ψŷ
r
t + ĉ
r
t − 2αŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) (5)
where x̂rt = x̂
∗
t − x̂t, ∀x, and π̂
r
t = π̂f,t − π̂h,t = ∆ŝt. Because terms-of-trade movements
do not replicate the flexible price equilibrium in a monetary union with asymmetric shocks
and sticky prices, we question the impact of alternative financial market structures on welfare.
Indeed, alternative financial market structures affect relative allocations and imply different
paths for relative prices, i.e. terms of trade. In the presence of nominal rigidities, the structure
of financial markets also shapes the dynamics of inflation rates. Under complete markets, real
marginal utilities from consumption are equated across countries, periods and states of the world
so that agent’s relative wealth are insulated from international or country-specific fluctuations.
In our framework, the corresponding risk-sharing condition relates terms of trade to relative
consumptions according to4
ĉrt = − (1− 2α) ŝt (6)
Under financial autarky, a zero trade balance condition
p̂h,t + ŷt − p̂t − ĉt = p̂f,t + ŷ
∗
t − p̂
∗
t − ĉ
∗
t = 0 (7)
is imposed. Combining with goods market clearing conditions
ŷt = (1− α) ĉt + αĉ
∗
t + 2µα (1− α) ŝt (8)
ŷ∗t = (1− α) ĉ
∗
t + αĉt − 2µα (1− α) ŝt (9)
yields the following relation between relative consumptions and the terms of trade
ĉrt = − (λ
a − 2α) ŝt (10)
where λa = 1 + 2 (µ− 1) (1− α).5 Allocations under both financial market structures coincide
exactly when µ = 1, as λa = 1 in this case. When the trade elasticity is unitary, the trade balance
is always in equilibrium as movements in imports are offset by equal movements in exports. The
open economy under complete markets is thus isomorphic to an open economy with financial
autarky. Precisely because of this, we focus on the case of a non-unitary trade elasticity. It is
clear from these equations that λa > 1 whenever µ > 1. Hence, for a given variation of terms
4In the particular case of a separable utility function with log specification for consumption, the risk-sharing
condition is p̂t + ĉt = p̂
∗
t + ĉ
∗
t , which, after exploiting the definition of CPIs pt = (1− α) ph,t + αpf,t and
p∗t = (1− α) pf,t + αph,t, and the definition of terms of trade st = pf,t − ph,t, gives Equation (6).
5The parameter λa is positive whenever µ > 1−2α
2(1−α)
, a condition that we consider as met from now on. The
condition is rather loose as it means µ > 1/2 when the economy is closed and less for an open economy with
α > 0.
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of trade, domestic and foreign consumptions will be less synchronized under financial autarky
than under complete markets, because the latter are more closely tied to income. A crucial
implication is that, when µ > 1, the positive cross-country transmission of asymmetric shocks
to the consumption of the other country will be larger under complete markets than under
financial autarky. However, these different external equilibrium conditions will also result in
different general equilibrium dynamics of terms of trade, an issue that we explore extensively in
the next paragraphs.
2.2 Welfare
We propose a fully micro-founded welfare analysis. In Appendix A.3, we show that a second-
order approximation of the utility function can be used and combined with second-order ap-
proximations of equilibrium conditions to derive an accurate measure of welfare within this
economy
Wt ≃ −
1
4
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
(ĉrs − c˜
r
s)
2 + 4µα (1− α) (ŝs − s˜s)
2 + ψ (ŷrs − y˜
r
s)
2 + θκ−1 (π̂rs)
2
)}
(11)
where tildes refer to the equilibrium under flexible prices and complete financial markets.6 First,
the derivation of this welfare measure does not make use of financial market conditions. There-
fore, this expression is valid to evaluate welfare both under complete markets and financial
autarky. However, precisely because gaps and PPI inflation rates will behave differently under
alternative financial market structures, welfare levels will differ. Second, because the steady state
of our economy is efficient, i.e. steady-state mark-ups are corrected by an optimal subsidy, our
welfare measure is purely quadratic. Using a first-order approximation of equilibrium conditions
to investigate the dynamics of gaps and inflation rates thus provides an accurate quantification
of welfare under alternative financial market structures (see Benigno and Woodford [2012]).7
Third, this welfare measure is very close to that derived by Benigno [2004]. Differences arise
from the fact that domestic and foreign consumption bundles share the exact same composition
in Benigno’s framework while they do not in our model, and from the use of the optimal mone-
tary policy of union-wide price stability, that closes union-wide gaps and implies π̂h,t+ π̂f,t = 0,
simplifying the way PPI inflation rates affect welfare (the last term in Equation (11)).8
2.3 Equilibria under flexible prices
Before analyzing equilibria under sticky prices, it is useful to understand how the model behaves
under flexible prices. With fully flexible prices the proportion of producers bound to keep prices
6Terms that depend on exogenous shocks only are ignored. They are irrelevant to rank alternative equilibria
in terms of welfare.
7Our results are therefore immune to the critique of Kim and Kim [2003].
8With identical consumption bundles, we would simply have ĉrt = c˜
r
t = 0 and ŷ
r
t − y˜
r
t would depend on ŝt − s˜t
only in our framework, allowing for further simplifications, as in Benigno [2004].
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unchanged (η) goes to zero, implying that κ→∞. Phillips curves imply
ψŷrt + ĉ
r
t − 2αŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t = 0 (12)
meaning that real marginal costs are constant. Combining with Equation (6) and Equations
(8)-(9), the equilibrium under complete markets and flexible prices is
c˜rt =
(1− 2α) (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
ârt = ̥
c
câ
r
t (13)
y˜rt =
λc (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
ârt = ̥
c
yâ
r
t (14)
s˜t = −
1 + ψ
1 + λcψ
ârt = ̥
c
sâ
r
t (15)
where λc = 1 + 4 (µ− 1)α (1− α) ≥ 0. The equilibrium under autarky with flexible prices is
derived combining Equation (12) with Equation (10) and Equations (8)-(9):
ĉrt =
λa − 2α
λa
ârt = ̥
a
c â
r
t (16)
ŷrt = â
r
t = ̥
a
yâ
r
t (17)
ŝt = −
1
λa
ârt = ̥
a
s â
r
t (18)
where λa = 1+2 (µ− 1) (1− α). Both equilibria imply qualitatively similar responses to shocks.
A positive domestic productivity shock (ârt < 0) increases the relative price of the foreign good
(ŝt > 0), raises domestic production more than foreign production (y˜
r
t < 0 and ŷ
r
t < 0) and
domestic consumption more than foreign consumption (c˜rt < 0 and ĉ
r
t < 0).
Quantitatively, equilibria produce different results depending on whether domestic and foreign
goods are substitutes or complements in utility, i.e. depending on the value of the trade elasticity
µ. First, notice that λa > λc > 1 when goods are substitutes, i.e. when µ > 1, while λa < λc
when µ < 1. When goods are substitutes (µ > 1), complete markets induce perfect risk-sharing
and imply that domestic and foreign consumption are closer than under autarky (|c˜rt | < |ĉ
r
t |).
9
This outcome is achieved by larger movements in terms of trade (|s˜t| > |ŝt|) as, when µ >
1, the difference in terms of trade reaction between complete markets and financial autarky
̥
c
s − ̥
a
s depends on λ
a − 1 + ψ (λa − λc) = 2 (µ− 1) (1− α) (1 + ψ (1− 2α)) and is positive
when µ > 1. Those terms-of-trade movements produce larger expenditure-switching effects, that
disconnect domestic and foreign output (|y˜rt | > |ŷ
r
t |). Indeed, the difference in the reaction of
relative products between complete markets and financial autarky ̥cy−̥
a
y = (λ
c − 1) / (1 + λcψ)
depends on λc − 1 and is therefore positive when µ > 1. These expenditure-switching effects
are further reinforced by terms-of-trade spillovers on hours worked especially when the Frisch
elasticity ψ−1 is high, i.e. when ψ is low, as in this case ̥cy −̥
a
y is larger.
9In Appendix A.4, we show that ̥cc < ̥
a
c when µ > 1.
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Under financial autarky, when µ > 1, the zero trade balance condition imposes smaller move-
ments in terms of trade and generates cross-country wealth effects, by which domestic and foreign
consumption are more distant. Expenditure-switching effects are thus smaller, and domestic and
foreign products evolve more in line than under complete markets. Cross-country wealth effects
thus attenuate the effects of terms-of-trade spillovers.
The adjustment pattern is different when goods are complements (µ < 1), as in this case,
complete markets induce risk-sharing through smaller movements in terms of trade as compared
to the zero trade balance condition: domestic and foreign output are thus closer under complete
markets than under autarky, and movements in terms of trade are smaller. Those results are
stated more formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With flexible prices, when µ > 1, terms of trade and relative outputs are more
volatile under complete markets than under autarky, and relative consumptions are less volatile.
When µ < 1, terms of trade and relative outputs are less volatile under complete markets than
under autarky.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
While these results will prove useful to understand the dynamics with sticky prices, the volatility
patterns under flexible prices result in unambiguous welfare effects, as relative inflation rates
are unaffected. Indeed, real marginal production costs are constant because any change in the
nominal wage is offset by a similar change in the production price. In terms of welfare, price
flexibility implies that the weight of π̂rt in Equation (11) goes to zero, so that
W flext ≃ −
1
4
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
(ĉrs − c˜
r
s)
2 + 4µα (1− α) (ŝs − s˜s)
2 + ψ (ŷrs − y˜
r
s)
2
)}
(19)
By definition of our welfare measure, under complete markets and flexible prices, W flex,comt = 0.
Hence, deviations from the complete-market equilibrium such as those implied by financial
autarky will induce W flex,autt < W
flex,com
t . Complete markets thus generate higher levels of
welfare compared to financial autarky under flexible prices. The very same outcome could be
reached with a flexible nominal exchange rate and two independent optimal monetary policies,
as in Benigno [2009]. In this case, we would have π̂h,t = π̂f,t = π̂
r
t = 0, and welfare would
evolve according to Equation (19) even though κ would be positive. With flexible prices or with
a flexible exchange rate and optimal national monetary policies, we conclude that complete
markets produce a higher level of welfare compared to financial autarky. This conclusion holds
true both when goods are substitutes (µ > 1) and complements (µ < 1) in utility. We show in
the next paragraph how price stickiness crucially alters this result.
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2.4 Equilibria under sticky prices
Contrary to the previous case, as long as prices are sticky within a monetary union with asym-
metric shocks, the weight of π̂rt in the welfare measure is non-null and π̂
r
t can not be equalized
to zero through monetary policy. The first-best equilibrium implying Wt = 0 is thus out of
reach under both financial market structures. Formally, recalling that πrt = ∆ŝt, and using the
relative Phillips curve (5), we can substitute for relative consumptions using Equation (6) under
complete markets or Equation (10) under autarky, and substitute for relative productions using
relative goods market clearing conditions (Equation (9) minus Equation (8)) to get{
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 + κ (− (1 + λ
cψ) ŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) under complete markets
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 + κ (− (1 + ψ)λ
aŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) under financial autarky
(20)
The model breaks down to a simple dynamic equation describing the evolution of terms of trade
with one lead and one lag. In Appendix A.5, we show that the solution of the this dynamic
equation implies
ŝt = ρ1ŝt−1 − ϕâ
r
t (21)
where ϕ = κρ1 (1 + ψ) / (1− ρ2ρa), ρ1 =
((
δ +
√
δ2 − 4β
)
/2
)−1
, ρ2 =
(
δ −
√
δ2 − 4β
)
/2 and
where ρa is the persistence of the productivity process. The key difference between complete
markets and financial autarky lies in the value of δ as
δ =
{
1 + β + κ (1 + λcψ) under complete markets
1 + β + κ (1 + ψ)λa under financial autarky
(22)
This solution allows us to derive some qualitative results about the volatility of terms of trade
ŝt and that of relative inflation rates ∆ŝt. We already shown that λ
a > λc > 1 when goods are
substitutes, i.e. when µ > 1. As a consequence δ is smaller under complete markets, making
both ρ1 and ρ2 larger (see Proposition 3 in Appendix A.5.3). As a result the immediate impact
of shocks on terms of trade (ϕ) will be larger under complete markets, and the effects will be
more persistent as ρ1 is larger under complete markets.
Let us focus first on the case of iid shocks, assuming ρa = 0. In this case, the variance of terms
of trade is
var (ŝt) =
κ2ρ21 (1 + ψ)
2
1− ρ21
var (ârt ) (23)
which, because ρ1 is larger under complete markets, implies that terms of trade are more volatile
under complete markets when µ > 1. In addition, the variance of relative inflation rates
var (∆ŝt) =
2κ2ρ21 (1 + ψ)
2
1 + ρ1
var (ârt ) (24)
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is increasing along with ρ1, showing that inflation rates are more volatile under complete markets
when µ > 1.10 In the more general case with persistent productivity shocks (ρa > 0), the variance
of terms of trade
var (ŝt) =
ϕ2
1− ρ21
1 + ρ1ρa
1− ρ1ρa
var (ârt ) (25)
is also larger under complete markets than under financial autarky when µ > 1 (See Proposition
3 in Appendix A.5.3). Qualitatively, the conclusion reached under flexible prices holds under
sticky prices. As already shown by de Paoli [2009], when goods are substitutes (µ > 1) perfect
risk-sharing implied by complete financial markets imposes larger variations in the real exchange
or relative prices under fixed exchange rates or in a monetary union, as compared to equilibria
under financial autarky. As a byproduct, we also show that the variance of relative inflation
rates
var (∆ŝt) =
ϕ22 (1− ρa)
1− ρ21
(
1− ρ1
1− ρ1ρa
)
var (ârt ) (26)
is larger under complete markets than under financial autarky when domestic and foreign goods
are substitutes in utility, i.e. when µ > 1 (See Proposition 4 in Appendix A.5.3). Given that
relative inflation rates are an argument of the welfare function (11), we conclude that complete
markets will produce larger welfare losses from nominal rigidities.
Additional intuition can be gained by analyzing the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs here-
after). Figure 1 reports the IRFs under alternative financial market structures after a 1% positive
domestic productivity shock for an illustrative calibration according to which domestic and for-
eign goods are substitutes.11
The pattern uncovered under flexible prices is qualitatively robust under sticky prices, but there
are important differences in the magnitude of impulse responses depending on the financial mar-
ket structure. Under complete markets, cross-country wealth effects are completely offset, as
the terms of trade move widely enough to keep relative wealth constant over time. As a conse-
quence, movements in relative consumptions are smaller. Under financial autarky, movements
in terms of trade are smaller, and relative consumptions fall more due to cross-country wealth
effects. Because prices are sticky, movements in relative inflation rates (∆ŝt) are also larger
under complete markets than under autarky, inducing larger costs from nominal rigidities.
This source of welfare costs can balance and even overturn the welfare gains from a better
sharing of risks when µ > 1. This point is made clearer when looking at the weights attached
to the different components of the welfare measure (11). One the one hand, weights attached
10It is clear that
ρ2
1
1+ρ1
is an increasing function in ρ1.
11For an illustrative purpose, we choose the following quarterly calibration: β = 0.99, ψ = 2, µ = 1.5, α = 0.2,
η = 0.75, ρa = 0.9, σ (ε
a
t ) = 0.01, and θ = 6.
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Figure 1: IRFs after a positive domestic productivity shock when µ = 1.5
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to the gap in relative consumptions, the terms-of-trade gap and the gap in relative outputs are
respectively 1, µ and ψ. For reasonable calibrations, none of these will be larger than 5 or 10. On
the other hand, the weight of relative inflation rates varies between zero (with flexible prices)
and infinity (with fully sticky prices), but for reasonable values of price rigidities (η = 0.75 for
instance) with a standard calibrated values of θ = 6 and β = 0.99, this weight will be around 70.
Given our qualitative result about the volatility of relative inflation rates, we reach the following
conclusions under sticky prices. First, when µ < 1, relative inflation rates are less volatile under
complete markets, resulting in lower welfare costs from nominal rigidities. Complete markets
thus always produce a higher level of welfare compared to financial autarky. Second, when µ > 1,
relative inflation rates aremore volatile under complete markets, resulting in higher welfare costs
from nominal rigidities. These costs may overturn the welfare gains from risk-sharing. This is
more likely when the degree of price stickiness is large, labor is highly elastic to wages, and the
trade elasticity is above one but not too large.
Even though we are able to track analytically the exact expression of welfare as a function of deep
parameters, this expression is quite intractable (see Appendix A.6). We thus present quantitative
evidence about the interactions of both welfare effects based on numerical experiments. We
consider some parameters as fixed, given the consensus about their calibrated value. Adopting
a quarterly perspective, the discount factor is β = 0.99. The share of imports in consumption
is α = 0.2, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties θ = 6. We then compute the
difference in welfare as a function of remaining parameters, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
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ψ, the persistence of productivity shocks ρa, the trade elasticity µ, and the Calvo parameter
η. Figure 2 reports areas of welfare reversals, i.e. areas where welfare is higher under financial
autarky than under complete markets, in the (η, µ) space for various combinations of (ψ, ρa).
Figure 2: Welfare reversal areas. Shaded areas denote parameterizations for which welfare is
higher under financial autarky than under complete markets.
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Figure 2 confirms that there is no welfare reversal when domestic and foreign goods are comple-
ments in utility, i.e. when µ < 1. Further, as long as domestic and foreign goods are substitutes
(µ > 1), for a given value of the trade elasticity, welfare reversals occur when prices are stick-
ier. Stickier prices raise the volatility of relative inflation rates and magnify their weight in the
welfare measure, which enhances the probability of a welfare reversal. However, the larger the
trade elasticity µ, the larger the price stickiness parameter needs to be to produce a welfare re-
versal. This is the case for two reasons. First, larger values of µ reduce the size of terms-of-trade
movements required to reach the external equilibrium under both financial market structures,
as they strengthen the magnitude of expenditure-switching effects for a given degree of price
stickiness. The volatility of relative inflation rates, and therefore the welfare costs of nominal
rigidities, are thus dampened under both financial market structures. Second, larger values of
µ increase the weight of the terms-of-trade gap in the welfare function relative to the weight of
relative inflation rates.
Figure 2 also shows that the Frisch elasticity ψ−1 affects reversal areas. When labor supply is
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more responsive, i.e. when ψ is low, the impact of expenditure-switching on output is magnified,
and differences in the dynamics of real marginal costs and inflation rates are larger. In addition,
the weight of the gap in relative outputs in the welfare measure falls relative to the weight of
relative inflation rates. Welfare reversal areas are thus wider when ψ is small.
Finally, the persistence of shocks also shapes welfare reversal areas. On the one hand, persis-
tence downplays the importance of nominal rigidities in the adjustment process and magnifies
the importance of allocation effects. As already shown by Baxter and Crucini [1995] and Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan [2002], the difference in real allocations resulting from alternative fi-
nancial market structures is larger when shocks are close-to-permanent. Welfare gains from
risk-sharing are thus more likely to be large. On the other hand, more persistent shocks imply
less consumption smoothing and larger movements in terms of trade, potentially raising the dif-
ference in welfare costs from nominal rigidities. As a result of those opposite effects, persistence
affects the difference in welfare in a non-linear way. It increases the probability of a welfare
reversal for intermediate to large values of persistence, and then decreases the probability for
close-to-permanent shocks (see Figure 4 in Appendix A.7).
2.5 Sensitivity to the policy set-up
In the previous section, we consider a very simple case where monetary policy fully stabilizes
union-wide inflation, abstracting from any kind of fiscal policy. We now investigate the occur-
rence of welfare reversals under a variety of policy arrangements. For the purpose, we incorporate
public spending in the utility function to the baseline model and consider alternative combina-
tions of monetary and fiscal policies. Lifetime welfare is now
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
(1− ̺) log cs + ̺ log gs − χ
n1+ψs
1 + ψ
)}
, 0 < ̺ < 1 (27)
where gt is the amount of public expenditure falling on goods produced locally. The decentralized
equilibrium is now characterized by the following government budget constraints and goods
market clearing conditions12
gt = taxt + τ
∫ 1
0
ph,t (ω) yt (ω) (28)
yt = (1− α)
(
ph,t
pt
)−µ
ct + α
(
ph,t
p∗t
)−µ
c∗t + gt (29)
It is clear from the modified utility function that the efficient steady-state provision of public
goods will be g = ̺y. In the following policy exercise, the decentralized steady state is thus
12Similar conditions hold in the foreign economy.
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consistent with the central planner steady state. All equilibria considered in this section share
the same steady state, and welfare differences relate to business cycle properties only.
We consider the following alternative policy set-ups. First, we compute Ramsey equilibria.13
Second, we consider the following monetary policy rule for the central bank of the monetary
union
rt
r
=
(rt−1
r
)dr ((πut
πu
)drpi (yut
y˜ut
)dry)1−dr
(30)
where yut = (yt)
1/2 (y∗t )
1/2 is the union-wide output and y˜ut its flexible prices equilibrium value.
Following the vast literature on fiscal rules, we consider the following fiscal policy rule for the
domestic government14
gt
g
=
(
gt−1
g
)dg ((yt
y˜t
)dgy)1−dg
(31)
and a symmetric rule for the foreign government.
We focus on the following cases: (A) active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy (gt = g) with
(A-I) optimized Taylor coefficients and (A-II) non-optimized Taylor coefficients, and (B) active
monetary policy with non-optimized coefficients and active fiscal policy with (B-I) optimized
coefficients on domestic output and (B-II) non-optimized coefficients on domestic output. We
calibrate the model in the following way. The discount factor is β = 0.99. Following the literature
reporting low values of the Frisch elasticity, we set ψ = 2. We set the share of public expenditure
in GDP to ̺ = 0.22. Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1993], the trade elasticity is
µ = 1.5. Using data on intra-zone trade flows for the Euro area, we set the share of imports
in consumption to α = 0.2. Evidence by Rumler [2007] suggests that the Calvo parameter on
price adjustment is η = 0.75. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is θ = 6. Finally,
the productivity shock has a persistence ρa = 0.9 and the standard deviation of innovations
is σ (εat ) = 0.00628. Table 1 reports the results in terms of welfare and volatility under the
alternative policy scenarios. The welfare analysis consists in the total welfare losses from business
cycles L = 100 (E (Wt)−W ) / (c+ c
∗) and the welfare difference between autarky and complete
financial markets W = 100
(
E
(
W autt
)
− E (W comt )
)
/ (c+ c∗).
13Under a full Ramsey policy, the central planner jointly determines and implements the optimal public spending
and monetary policies so as to maximize the aggregate welfare within the monetary union subject to the set of
equilibrium conditions. As Ramsey policies are typically known to be time-inconsistent, we adopt the timeless
perspective (see Woodford [1999] and Giannoni and Woodford [2002]). More precisely, we assume that optimal
conditions at time zero are set consistently with a previous commitment, such as the one described by optimal
conditions between period t and t+1. We solve for Ramsey policies using the “get ramsey” procedure developed
by Lo´pez-Salido and Levin [2004] and used in Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams [2006]. We simulate the
model with a second-order approximation to the optimal conditions using Dynare (http://www.dynare.org/).
14See Beetsma and Jensen [2005], Ferrero [2009], Gal´ı and Monacelli [2008], Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines and Wren-
Lewis [2007], Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis [2012] and Pappa and Vassilatos [2007] among others for theoretical
contributions, and Candelon, Muysken and Vermeulen [2010], Fata´s and Mihov [2003], Gal´ı and Perotti [2003]
and Wyplosz [2002] among others for empirical contributions.
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Table 1: Standard deviations and welfare
Financial autarky
A B Ramsey
I II I II
σ (y) 1.3665 1.2121 1.4379 1.5608 1.3906
σ (c) 1.6389 1.4227 1.3894 1.0198 1.1919
σ (g) − − 1.3189 3.7053 1.9679
σ (n) 0.3599 0.3537 0.3355 0.3927 0.1239
σ (πi) 0.4196 0.1374 0.3396 0.1983 0.0988
σ (s) 1.1054 1.1053 0.9967 0.7825 0.8838
dr 0.7000 0.0473
∗ 0.7000 0.7000 −
drpi 1.5000 99661
∗ 1.5000 1.5000 −
dry 0.1250 0.0255
∗ 0.1250 0.1250 −
dg − − 0.7000 0.8959
∗ −
dgy − − −0.5000 −2.5540
∗ −
L (%) 8.5142 1.3294 5.3997 2.8919 0.5909
Complete financial markets
σ (y) 1.3977 1.2394 1.4526 1.5672 1.4323
σ (c) 1.5293 1.2856 1.2921 0.9037 1.0836
σ (g) − − 1.2103 3.6413 2.2322
σ (n) 0.3771 0.3638 0.3658 0.4213 0.1205
σ (πi) 0.4287 0.1798 0.3510 0.2013 0.1214
σ (s) 1.5884 1.5884 1.4991 1.2395 1.2307
dr 0.7000 0.0000
∗ 0.7000 0.7000 −
drpi 1.5000 2.9700
∗ 1.5000 1.5000 −
dry 0.1250 0.0359
∗ 0.1250 0.1250 −
dg − − 0.7000 0.8968
∗ −
dgy − − −0.5000 −2.9698
∗ −
L (%) 8.9737 1.8905 5.9013 3.1021 0.8647
Welfare difference
W (%) 0.4594 0.5611 0.5016 0.2102 0.2738
∗ : Optimized coefficients. A-I: Passive fiscal policy and active mone-
tary policy with non-optimized coefficients. A-II: Passive fiscal policy
and active monetary policy with optimized coefficients. B-I: Active mon-
etary policy with non-optimized coefficients and active fiscal policy and
with non-optimized coefficients. B-II: Active monetary policy with non-
optimized coefficients and active fiscal policy and with optimized coeffi-
cients.
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Table 1 reports the expected ranking of policies in terms of welfare losses from fluctuations. Ob-
viously, full Ramsey policies deliver the lowest welfare losses (last column). A set-up with passive
fiscal policy and active monetary policy with non-optimized coefficients yields the largest welfare
losses from fluctuations (first column). Adding active fiscal policies lowers welfare losses by a
substantial amount, especially with optimized public spending rules (fourth column). Among
set-ups with policy rules, a set-up with an optimized monetary policy rule and passive fiscal pol-
icy delivers the lowest level of welfare losses (second column). The high ranking of union-wide
price stability policies points to the large contribution of the volatility of inflation rates in the
welfare loss function, as seen in the previous section. In addition, the ranking of welfare losses
follows closely the ranking of producer price inflation volatility.
Given the value of optimized coefficients, the optimal monetary policy consists in stabilizing
union-wide inflation. Because the union-wide output gap is strictly tied to the union-wide infla-
tion rate when the business cycle is driven by productivity shocks only, this policy also closes
the union-wide output gap. In other words there is no trade-off in policy objectives from a
union-wide perspective, consistently with Gal´ı and Monacelli [2008]. Optimized fiscal policies
are counter-cyclical with respect to output gaps, seek to close national gaps, and feature a large
persistence term. However, contrary to the case of monetary policy, there is a trade-off between
the strength of fiscal stabilization and the associated welfare costs. Indeed, as public expenditure
enters the utility function of households, deviations from the efficient provision of public goods
implied by stabilization policies also incur some welfare costs. This trade-off is mostly apparent
when comparing the volatility of public expenditure under optimized fiscal rules and under the
Ramsey policy.
Under all policy arrangements, a regular pattern governs the volatility of key variables under
alternative financial markets. Output, PPI inflation rates and terms of trade are always more
volatile under complete markets than under financial autarky. Under all set-ups except under
Ramsey policies, hours are also more volatile under complete financial markets. Private con-
sumptions on the other hand are always less volatile under complete markets. Hence, none of
the policies considered in Table 1 reverse the mechanism highlighted in the previous section,
according to which complete markets produce a lower level of welfare than financial autarky.
Another noticeable result is that a more efficient monetary policy (optimized vs. non-optimized)
magnifies the welfare difference between both financial market structures, while more efficient
fiscal policies (optimized vs. non-optimized) reduce the welfare difference for a given monetary
policy. This highlights the essential role played by monetary and fiscal policies in shaping the
extent of business cycle asymmetries within the monetary union. A more efficient monetary
policy is beneficial in the sense that the volatility of union-wide inflation is brought down, but
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at the same time contributes to the increase in national inflation rate asymmetries. Fiscal policies
are more efficient in handling asymmetries but are insufficient to prevent welfare reversals, due
to the trade-off between the costs and benefits of stabilization. Overall, Table 1 shows that
welfare reversals arise for a wide range of stabilization policies, regardless of their efficiency in
stabilizing the economy.
3 A medium-scale monetary union model
We now investigate the welfare difference implied by alternative financial markets structures in a
richer two-country model a` la Smets and Wouters [2003]. The latter embeds additional frictions
such as sticky wages, capital accumulation with investment adjustment costs, variable capacity
utilization, external habits in consumption and a much wider set of shocks, including produc-
tivity shocks, investment shocks, mark-up shocks, public spending shocks, preference shocks,
monetary policy and inflation target shocks. In addition, we consider incomplete markets with
portfolio adjustment costs rather than financial autarky as the alternative to complete mar-
kets, as this assumption is a more realistic description of adjustments in international financial
markets. The full model is described in Appendix B.1, and equilibrium conditions in level are
solved using a second-order approximation.15 This approach allows us to evaluate the welfare
losses from fluctuations under alternative financial markets structures, as unconditional means
differ from steady-state values through the impact of second-order moments on first-order mo-
ments. Alternatively, using a first-order approximation would require the derivation of an exact
expression of welfare using second-order approximations of equilibrium conditions, which is out
of reach given the dimension of the model.
3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the closed economy version of the Euro Area model of Smets and
Wouters [2003]. We consider a symmetric calibration across countries in the baseline case, and
purely asymmetric shocks. Steady-state mark-ups are assumed to be corrected by appropriate
subsidies. Further, following Pappa and Vassilatos [2007], we set the share of imports to α = 0.2.
The value of µ is widely debated in the literature. The range of empirical estimates is typically
very large and includes values as low as 0.43 (see Lubik and Schorfheide [2006]), as well as
values as large as 4 or 6 (see Broda and Weinstein [2006]) or more (see Harrigan [1993]). The
literature on international business cycles usually sets this parameter to intermediate values to
match the volatility of the trade balance (see Backus et al. [1993]). Following this literature,
we set µ = 1.5, and present an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.
Table 3 in Appendix B.3 reports the baseline parameter values. Alternative calibrations could
15We use the Dynare routine.
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follow Pytlarczyk [2005] or de Walque, Smets and Wouters [2005]. However, those work produce
quite different estimates for structural parameters and imply different patterns of international
spillovers. This lack of consensus for the Euro Area suggests that medium-scale models may not
produce a reliable representation of the business cycle, and that the implied predictions should
be interpreted with caution.
3.2 Welfare
Table 2 reports the difference in welfare expressed as a percentage of steady-state current con-
sumption W = 100
(
E
(
W inct
)
− E (W comt )
)
/ (c+ c∗) for different model specifications and for
a variety of shocks.
Table 2: Difference in welfare between incomplete and complete financial markets,
in % of steady-state consumption
Prod. Pref. Pub. Mk-up Invt. All No Pref.
σa σb + σn σg σw + σp σi − –
I 0.0473 0.4845 0.0014 −0.0000 – 0.5332 0.0486
II: I + indexation −0.0046 −0.5829 −0.0079 0.0000 – −0.5954 −0.0125
III: I + sticky wages 0.0212 −0.2328 −0.0006 0.0000 – −0.2122 0.0206
I + habit 0.1334 1.3782 0.0013 0.0000 – 1.5128 0.1347
I + capital 0.0538 0.2389 0.0037 −0.0000 0.0002 0.2966 0.0577
IV: I + habit + capital 0.1375 0.6149 0.0056 0.0000 0.0004 0.7585 0.1436
V: Full model −0.0447 −0.7511 −0.0364 −0.0001 −0.0085 −0.8407 −0.0896
V − indexation (γw = γp = 0) 0.0490 −0.3876 −0.0039 0.0000 −0.0005 −0.3429 0.0447
I: Flex. wages (ηw = 0), no cap. acc. (ι = 0), no habit (hc = 0), no indexation (γw = γp = 0)
Model I is the closest to the simple model presented in the previous section. We start from this
model and look at how the different assumptions considered in the medium-scale model affect
the probability of a welfare reversal. Model I predicts a moderate welfare reversal under all
driving forces of the business cycle, except for mark-up shocks, but the latter account for a very
low share of the variance of key variables.
Model II introduces price indexation, and changes the previous result, as the model with com-
plete markets produces a higher level of welfare. Price indexation cuts the volatility of price
inflation rates, and reduces the dispersion of PPIs, thereby moderating the welfare costs from
nominal rigidities under both financial market structures. The cut is large enough to let the
welfare gains from risk-sharing under complete markets outweigh the larger costs from nominal
rigidities.
Model III is the baseline model of Section 2 augmented with sticky wages. In this case again,
when all shocks are considered together, complete markets dominate. The reason is that wage
stickiness reduces the size of cross-country wealth effects by partially muting the impact response
of labor supply. This in turn favors the model with complete markets in terms of welfare
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with respect to the model with incomplete markets. This effect also lowers the domination
of the incomplete market model with productivity shocks only, but essentially changes the
welfare ranking with preference shocks only. When all shocks are considered, the welfare ranking
induced by preference shocks dominates, and complete markets produce welfare gains. This result
highlights the overwhelming importance of preference shocks in the variance decomposition of
key variables in Model III, including welfare.16 As shown in Table 2, removing those shocks and
leaving productivity shocks be the main driver of the business cycle changes the prediction of
Model III, as the model with incomplete markets dominates in terms of welfare. An important
conclusion is that welfare reversals are quite sensitive to the shock structure chosen to represent
the business cycle.
Adding capital accumulation, habit persistence, or both as in model IV, does not change the
prediction of model I. Finally, considering the full model (model V), complete markets produce
a higher level of welfare compared to incomplete markets. The result is robust to removing
preference shocks.
Those results show the high sensitivity of welfare reversals to the size of the welfare costs from
nominal rigidities and to the strength of cross-country wealth effects. Any mechanism reducing
the welfare costs from price stickiness, as indexation, or attenuating the strength of cross-country
wealth effects, as wage stickiness, contributes to lower the probability of a welfare reversal.
Further, capital accumulation and external habit formation do not change qualitatively the
prediction of the stylized model. From a quantitative perspective, however, the former dampens
and the latter magnifies the welfare difference between equilibria under complete and incomplete
financial markets. Lastly, our results suggest that welfare reversals are sensitive to the structure
and calibration of shocks driving the business cycle.
Quantitatively, differences in welfare losses from fluctuations are quite small in absolute terms,
but rather important relative to the total welfare losses from business cycles. In the full model
(model V), the total losses from fluctuations represent 2.91% of steady-state consumption, or
equivalently 0.0291% of permanent steady-state consumption, a measure that is consistent with
Lucas [2003]. The welfare difference between complete and incomplete markets is 0.84% of
steady-state consumption in favor of the complete market equilibrium, which represents about
30% of total welfare losses. Hence, even though figures reported in Table 2 seem small, they
represent a non-negligible share of the welfare losses from fluctuations.
16As shown in Appendix B.4, with the standard Smets and Wouters [2003] calibration, after removing the
contribution of monetary shocks, preference shocks account for 94% of the variance of output, 95% of the variance
of consumption, 70% of the variance of hours, 82% of the variance of PPI inflation rates and 97% of the variance
of welfare.
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3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We now conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters. While the response of
monetary policy to the union-wide inflation rate has negligible effects on the occurrence of welfare
reversals, the trade openness parameter α and the cross-country correlation of shocks both reduce
the welfare difference between equilibria under complete and incomplete markets, by making the
monetary union more homogeneous.17 When the share of imports increases, asymmetric shocks
are more powerfully transmitted to the rest of the monetary union through trade in consumption
and capital goods, making the business cycle more synchronized among union’s members, and
risk-sharing through financial markets less relevant for households’ welfare. Similarly, when
the correlation of shocks increases, welfare differences are attenuated, and simply vanish when
shocks are perfectly correlated. In this case, the monetary union and member countries behave
as a single closed economy where the structure of financial markets is irrelevant for welfare.
Figure 3 reports the sensitivity of W to changes in the value of the trade elasticity µ, the level
of the Calvo parameters on prices ηp and wages ηw, and the degree of heterogeneity in Calvo
price contracts Ω.18
Figure 3: Sensitivity of W to changes in key parameters of the model.
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17Those results are not reported but available upon request.
18Heterogeneity in Calvo contracts is considered as in Benigno [2004], assuming that the average duration of
price contracts remains constant and equal to its calibrated value but results from heterogeneous durations across
the monetary union. More precisely, we assume (1− ηp)−1/2 (1− ηp∗)−1/2 = (1− ηp)−1, vary ηp and report the
results as a function of Ω = ηp/ηp∗.
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The trade elasticity is a crucial parameter for the welfare ranking of alternative financial markets.
Model I, the baseline model, and model IV, that imbeds capital accumulation and external habit
in consumption, behave very similarly, as equilibria under complete markets welfare-dominate
for low values of the trade elasticity, are dominated for intermediate values, between 0.85 and
2.5, and dominate again for large values of the trade elasticity. This pattern is virtually identical
to that uncovered in the previous section, except that the threshold for the trade elasticity is
now less than one, because the zero trade balance condition depends on additional parameters.
Model II, with indexation, and model V, the full Smets and Wouters [2003] model, insensitively
predict that complete markets deliver higher levels of welfare. Finally, model III predicts a small
welfare reversal for a very narrow interval of the trade elasticity, between 0.95-1.15.
Model I, III and IV produce a strictly increasing relation between the difference in welfare and
the Calvo parameter on producer prices ηp. The introduction of indexation in model II and V
produces a slightly different pattern, as the relation is flat or decreasing for low values of ηp and
then increasing for larger values. In all cases but the full model (model V), there exists a value
of ηp that is large enough to produce a welfare reversal, even though this value is empirically
unrealistic for model III and model IV.
The degree of wage rigidity (ηw) exerts a negative effect on the occurrence of welfare reversals
for all models as long as ηp < 0.9. This can easily be understood as a higher degree of wage
rigidity de-emphasizes the importance of cross-country wealth effects. More generally, welfare
reversals are directly related to the strength of the wealth effects generated under incomplete
financial markets. Hence, any mechanism altering the transmission of expenditure-switching
effects to labor supply and output, such as the mechanism proposed by Gal´ı [2011] or Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Huffman [1988] preferences could change the ranking of alternative financial
market structures. When ηp > 0.9, however, welfare reversals arise as wage stickiness indirectly
participates to the stickiness of terms of trade, through their impact on relative marginal costs.
With highly sticky wages, this effect is large enough to counterbalance the negative impact on
cross-country wealth effects.
Finally, heterogeneity in Calvo price contracts Ω alters the magnitude of welfare difference but
does not change welfare reversal patterns.
4 Conclusion
A two-country monetary union with home bias, sticky prices and country-specific shocks is a
second-best environment. A central bank can not close all gaps and replicate the flexible prices
equilibrium. National inflation rates are thus different from zero, and the dynamics of relative
prices is different from its flexible prices dynamics. Alternative financial market structures, as
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they alter the dynamics of relative prices, also affect the dynamics of national inflation rates,
and shape the welfare costs from nominal rigidities.
In this paper, we have shown that complete financial markets, while they produce welfare gains
through perfect risk-sharing compared to incomplete markets, can also bring welfare costs by
increasing the volatility of inflation rates when the Marshall-Lerner condition on the trade
balance is met. The value of the trade elasticity and the degree of price stickiness are crucial to
determine the extent of what we have called welfare reversals. The value of the Frisch elasticity on
labor supply and the persistence of shocks are also very important, as they affect the magnitude
of cross-country wealth effects and distortions in allocations respectively. Further, we have shown
that welfare reversals can arise even with an extended number of policy instruments under a
variety of stabilization policies, including (Ramsey) optimal policies.
Finally, a robustness exercise has shown that our result is more fragile within a medium-scale
model a` la Smets and Wouters [2003]. Price indexation lowers the dispersion of producer prices
and the welfare costs from nominal rigidities both under complete and incomplete markets, which
favors complete market equilibria in terms of welfare. Wage rigidity also lowers the probability of
welfare reversals, reducing the impact of cross-country wealth effects, on which welfare reversals
crucially depend. In addition, we have shown that the shock structure chosen to represent the
business cycle matters, as various combinations of driving forces can lead to different welfare
rankings.
Overall, the paper presents a variety of situations where welfare reversals can occur within
a monetary union. Given the high level of uncertainty concerning the “true” model of the
European economy, it makes an important warning against the simplistic logic according to
which further financial market integration within a monetary union always yields welfare gains.
Further, given the documented inability of New-Keynesian models to price assets and risks
correctly, our estimates may constitute a lower bound of the welfare losses from further financial
market integration. A policy aimed at increasing real, trade and financial integration all together
would undoubtedly minimize the chances of generating welfare costs, in comparison to financial
market integration policies alone. Any policy seeking to make a monetary union behave as a
homogeneous economy would attenuate reliance on financial markets to share risks, and hence,
make welfare reversals irrelevant from the perspective of citizens.
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A The stylized model
A.1 Assumptions
The monetary union is composed of two areas of identical size, the home country and the foreign
country. The representative household of the domestic economy maximizes a welfare index
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
log cs − χ
n1+ψs
1 + ψ
)}
, 0 < β < 1, χ > 0, ψ > 0 (A.1)
subject to the following budget constraint
rt,t+1bt + ptct = bt−1 + wtnt + ϕt − taxt (A.2)
In Equation (A.1), β is the subjective discount factor, ct is the level of consumption and nt is
the level of hours worked. In Equation (A.2), bt is the holding of a portfolio of Arrow-Debreu
securities that are traded before policy choices are made (see Senay and Sutherland (2007, 2011)).
The portfolio delivers a state-contingent return rt,t+1 between period t and t + 1. Risk-sharing
is thus perfect. The CPI is denoted pt, the nominal wage is wt, ϕt =
∫ 1
0
ϕt(ω)dω is the profit
paid by the monopolistic firms to the domestic households, and taxt is a lump-sum tax. Under
complete markets, since foreign households solve a similar problem, first-order conditions are
χnψt ct =
wt
pt
(A.3)
χn∗ψt c
∗
t =
w∗t
p∗t
(A.4)
βEt
(
rtptct
pt+1ct+1
)
= 1 (A.5)
p∗t c
∗
t
ptct
= Θ (A.6)
where stars characterize foreign variables. In these expressions, rt is the risk-free return on a
one-period asset and Θ is a constant reflecting the initial foreign asset positions. From now on,
we assume Θ = 1.
As an alternative financial market structure, we consider an extreme version of financial markets
incompleteness and assume financial autarky. In this case, relative prices adjust to induce a zero
trade balance each period. The risk-sharing condition (A.6) is therefore replaced by
ptct
ph,tyt
=
p∗t c
∗
t
pf,ty∗t
= 1 (A.7)
while other first-order conditions remain unchanged.
Households also optimize over the composition of the consumption bundle (see Gal´ı and Mona-
celli [2005] or Pappa and Vassilatos [2007]). Households consume both domestic and foreign
goods. Both goods are imperfectly substitutable with elasticity of substitution µ > 0. In addi-
tion, households’ preferences are biased towards local goods. We denote (1− α) ∈ [1/2, 1] as the
27
share of domestic goods in the consumption bundle of the domestic household and consider a
symmetric structure for the consumption basket of the foreign household:
ct =
(
(1− α)
1
µ (ch,t)
µ−1
µ + α
1
µ (cf,t)
µ−1
µ
) µ
µ−1
, and c∗t =
(
(1− α)
1
µ
(
c∗h,t
)µ−1
µ + α
1
µ
(
c∗f,t
)µ−1
µ
) µ
µ−1
(A.8)
Companion consumption price indices are
pt =
(
(1− α) p1−µh,t + αp
1−µ
f,t
) 1
1−µ
, and p∗t =
(
(1− α) p1−µf,t + αp
1−µ
h,t
) 1
1−µ
(A.9)
where pf,t and ph,t denote the prices of goods produced in the home and foreign country respec-
tively. The optimal allocation of expenditure between each type of good is thus given by
ch,t = (1− α)
(
ph,t
pt
)
−µ
ct and cf,t = α
(
pf,t
pt
)
−µ
ct (A.10)
c∗f,t = (1− α)
(
pf,t
p∗t
)
−µ
c∗t and c
∗
h,t = α
(
ph,t
p∗t
)
−µ
c∗t (A.11)
Defining the terms of trade st = pf,t/ph,t, and using the structure of price indices, labor supply
conditions are
χnψt ct =
wt
ph,t
(
1− α+ αs1−µt
) 1
µ−1
(A.12)
χn∗ψt c
∗
t =
w∗t
pf,t
(
1− α+ αsµ−1t
) 1
µ−1
(A.13)
Each type of good is a composite of national varieties with a constant elasticity of substitution
θ > 1. Optimal variety demands are thus
ci,t (ω) =
(
pi,t (ω)
pi,t
)
−θ
ci,t, and c
∗
i,t (ω) =
(
pi,t (ω)
pi,t
)
−θ
c∗i,t, for i = h, f (A.14)
In each country, a unit continuum of firms indexed in ω produce varieties of each type of good
according to
yt (ω) = atnt (ω) and y
∗
t (ω) = a
∗
tn
∗
t (ω) (A.15)
where at and a∗t are exogenous measures of productivity. Following Calvo [1983], prices are set
optimally subject to the constraint that only a fraction (1− η) ∈ [0, 1] of producers is allowed to
reset prices, other producers updating prices at the pace of steady-state inflation πh = πf = 1,
and subject to the variety demands of households. The corresponding optimal pricing condition
for re-setters is
ph,t (ω) =
θ
(θ − 1) (1− τ)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βηh
)
wt+syt+s (ω) (ph,t+sat+sct+s)
−1
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βηh) yt+s (ω) c
−1
t+s
(A.16)
where τ is a constant tax introduced to offset the first-order distortions related to monopolistic
competition. The optimal steady-state level of this tax is negative, and so turns out to be a sub-
sidy, financed by the lump-sum tax imposed on the household. Government budget constraints
are thus
taxt + τ
∫ 1
0
ph,t (ω) yt (ω) = 0, and tax
∗
t + τ
∫ 1
0
pf,t (ω) y
∗
t (ω) = 0 (A.17)
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The aggregation of the model is straightforward as goods market clearing condition are
yt = (1− α)
(
ph,t
pt
)
−µ
ct + α
(
ph,t
p∗t
)
−µ
c∗t , and y
∗
t = (1− α)
(
pf,t
p∗t
)
−µ
c∗t + α
(
pf,t
pt
)
−µ
ct (A.18)
while labor market clearing conditions are
nt =
∫ 1
0
nt (ω) dω, and n
∗
t =
∫ 1
0
n∗t (ω) dω (A.19)
implying that aggregate production functions are
ytΥt = atnt, and y
∗
tΥ
∗
t = a
∗
tn
∗
t (A.20)
where Υt and Υ∗t denote the dispersion of producer prices.
A.2 Steady state and linearization
Assuming a = a∗ = 1, χ = 1 and τ = (1− θ)−1, the symmetric steady state of this economy is
r = 1/β, y = y∗ = c = c∗ = πh = πf = π = π∗ = 1, ph = pf = p = p∗ = w = w∗. As in any
cashless economy, nominal price levels are undetermined. We thus assume p = 1 without loss
of generality. Linearizing the labor supply equations, combining with production functions and
assuming symmetric nominal rigidities, the dynamics of inflation rates are
π̂h,t = βEtπ̂h,t+1 + κ (ψŷt + ĉt + αŝt − (1 + ψ) ât) (A.21)
π̂f,t = βEtπ̂f,t+1 + κ (ψŷ
∗
t + ĉ
∗
t − αŝt − (1 + ψ) â
∗
t ) (A.22)
where hats denote logs and κ = (1− η) (1− βη) /η. Under complete markets, the risk-sharing
condition yields
ĉt = ĉ
∗
t + (1− 2α) ŝt (A.23)
while under autarky we have
ĉt = ĉ
∗
t + ŷt − ŷ
∗
t − 2αŝt (A.24)
Goods market clearing conditions are
ŷt = (1− α) ĉt + αĉ
∗
t + 2µα (1− α) ŝt (A.25)
ŷ∗t = (1− α) ĉ
∗
t + αĉt − 2µα (1− α) ŝt (A.26)
The model is closed by considering the dynamics of consumption. We assume that the central
bank of the monetary union fully stabilizes the union-wide inflation rate at all times, so that
π̂h,t + π̂f,t = π̂t + π̂
∗
t = 0 (A.27)
As a consequence, union-wide consumption and output are just
ŷt + ŷ
∗
t = ĉt + ĉ
∗
t = ât + â
∗
t (A.28)
While union-wide variables are determined independently of the structure of financial markets,
relative variables are not. Defining x̂rt = x̂
∗
t − x̂t, ∀x, using the definition of terms of trade, and
combining both Phillips curves, terms of trade evolve according to
π̂rt = βEtπ̂
r
t+1 + κ (ψŷ
r
t + ĉ
r
t − 2αŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) (A.29)
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The goods market clearing condition is
ŷrt = (1− 2α) ĉ
r
t − 4µα (1− α) ŝt (A.30)
and the international condition is given by{
ĉrt = (2α− 1) ŝt under complete markets
ĉrt = ŷ
r
t + 2αŝt under financial autarky
(A.31)
A.3 Welfare
We start from the following second-order approximation of the utility function and using n =
χ = 1, we get
ut ≃ u+ ĉt − n̂t −
(1 + ψ)
2
n̂2t (A.32)
An exact log-transformation of the aggregate production function gives
n̂t = ŷt + Υ̂t − ât (A.33)
so that
ut ≃ ĉt − ŷt − Υ̂t −
(1 + ψ)
2
(
ŷ2t − 2ŷtât
)
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.34)
where O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
captures terms of order 3 and higher. Exogenous terms like shocks are also
omitted. As shown by Gal´ı and Monacelli [2005], Υ̂t is of second-order so Υ̂tŷt or Υ̂tât and Υ̂2t are
of third and fourth order respectively, and included in O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
. Deriving a similar second-order
approximation of the utility function for foreign households and considering union-wide welfare
gives
ut + u
∗
t ≃ ĉt + ĉ
∗
t − (ŷt + ŷ
∗
t )−
(
Υ̂t + Υ̂
∗
t
)
−
(1 + ψ)
2
((
ŷ2t − 2ŷtât
)
+
(
ŷ∗2t − 2ŷ
∗
t â
∗
t
))
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.35)
A second-order approximation of goods market clearing conditions is then used
ŷt + ŷ
∗
t = ĉt + ĉ
∗
t +
1
2
ĉ2t +
1
2
ĉ∗2t + µα (1− α) ŝ
2
t −
1
2
ŷ2t −
1
2
ŷ∗2t +O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.36)
and plugged in the previous equation
ut + u
∗
t ≃ −
1
2
ĉ2t −
1
2
ĉ∗2t − µα (1− α) ŝ
2
t −
ψ
2
(
ŷ2t + ŷ
∗2
t
)
−
(
Υ̂t + Υ̂
∗
t
)
+ (1 + ψ) (ŷtât + ŷ
∗
t â
∗
t ) +O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.37)
We now use
ŷ2t + ŷ
∗2
t =
1
2
(
ŷ2t + ŷ
∗2
t
)2
+
1
2
(
ŷ∗2t − ŷ
2
t
)2
=
1
2
(ŷut )
2
+
1
2
(ŷrt )
2
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.38)
ĉ2t + ĉ
∗2
t =
1
2
(
ĉ2t + ĉ
∗2
t
)2
+
1
2
(
ĉ∗2t − ĉ
2
t
)2
=
1
2
(ĉut )
2
+
1
2
(ĉrt )
2
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.39)
Because of our assumption about monetary policy, the following relation holds
ŷt + ŷ
∗
t = ĉt + ĉ
∗
t = ât + â
∗
t (A.40)
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The welfare function thus simplifies to
ut + u
∗
t ≃ −
1
4
(ĉrt )
2
− µα (1− α) ŝ2t −
ψ
4
(ŷrt )
2
−
(
Υ̂t + Υ̂
∗
t
)
+ (1 + ψ) (ŷtât + ŷ
∗
t â
∗
t ) +O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.41)
In addition,
ŷtât + ŷ
∗
t â
∗
t =
1
2
(ŷt + ŷ
∗
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ŷut
(ât + â
∗
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
âut
+
1
2
(ŷ∗t − ŷt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ŷrt
(â∗t − ât)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ârt
(A.42)
which, using ŷut = â
u
t yields
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ut + u
∗
t ≃ −
1
4
(ĉrt )
2
− µα (1− α) ŝ2t −
ψ
4
(ŷrt )
2
−
(
Υ̂t + Υ̂
∗
t
)
+
(1 + ψ)
2
ŷrt â
r
t +O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.43)
Let us define
c˜rt =
(1− 2α) (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
ârt (A.44)
y˜rt =
λc (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
ârt (A.45)
s˜t = −
1 + ψ
1 + λcψ
ârt (A.46)
with λc = 1+4 (µ− 1)α (1− α) ≥ 0, where tildes denote the equilibrium under flexible prices and
complete markets. Using these equations:
(1 + ψ)
2
ŷrt â
r
t =
ψ
2
λc (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
ârt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
2
y˜rt
ŷrt +
(1 + ψ)
2 (1 + λcψ)
ŷrt â
r
t
=
ψ
2
y˜rt ŷ
r
t +
(1 + ψ) (1− 2α)
2 (1 + λcψ)
ârt︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2
c˜rt
ĉrt −
4µα (1− α) (1 + ψ)
2 (1 + λcψ)
ârt︸ ︷︷ ︸
−2µα(1−α)s˜t
ŝt
=
ψ
2
y˜rt ŷ
r
t +
1
2
c˜rt ĉ
r
t + 2µα (1− α) s˜tŝt (A.47)
Plugging in the welfare function
ut + u
∗
t ≃ −
1
4
(ĉrt − c˜
r
t )
2
− µα (1− α) (ŝt − s˜t)
2
−
ψ
4
(ŷrt − y˜
r
t )
2
−
(
Υ̂t + Υ̂
∗
t
)
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.48)
Now the lifetime welfare measure, using the result of Woodford [2003] can be expressed as
Wt ≃ Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
−
1
4
(ĉrs − c˜
r
s)
2
− µα (1− α) (ŝs − s˜s)
2
−
ψ
4
(ŷrs − y˜
r
s)
2
−
θπ̂2h,s
2κh
−
θπ̂2f,s
2κf
)}
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.49)
Recalling that we consider symmetric nominal rigidities κh = κf = κ and using
π̂h,t =
1
2
(π̂h,t + π̂f,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
1
2
π̂rt (A.50)
π̂f,t =
1
2
(π̂h,t + π̂f,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
1
2
π̂rt (A.51)
19Terms that depend on exogenous shocks only are irrelevant to compare welfare under alternative financial
market structures, that affect the path of endogenous variables.
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we get
Wt ≃ −
1
4
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
(ĉrs − c˜
r
s)
2
+ 4µα (1− α) (ŝs − s˜s)
2
+ ψ (ŷrs − y˜
r
s)
2
+ θκ−1 (π̂rs)
2
)}
+O
(
‖ξ‖
3
)
(A.52)
A.4 Equilibria under flexible prices
We compare variances under alternative financial markets structures:
var (s˜t)− var (ŝt) =
(
(̥cs)
2
− (̥as)
2
)
var (ârt ) (A.53)
var (c˜rt )− var (ĉ
r
t ) =
(
(̥cc)
2
− (̥ac )
2
)
var (ârt ) (A.54)
var (y˜rt )− var (ŷ
r
t ) =
((
̥
c
y
)2
−
(
̥
a
y
)2)
var (ârt ) (A.55)
Given the domains of parameters considered, we have ψ ≥ 0, λc > 0, and λa > 0. Therefore
sign(var (s˜t)− var (ŝt)) = sign [(1 + ψ)λ
a − (1 + λcψ)] (A.56)
which using the definitions of λc = 1 + 4 (µ− 1)α (1− α) , and λa = 1 + 2 (µ− 1) (1− α), can be
written as
sign [(1 + ψ) (λa)− (1 + λcψ)] = sign [2 (µ− 1) (1− α) (1 + ψ (1− 2α))] (A.57)
Therefore, given the domains of parameters,
sign(var (s˜t)− var (ŝt)) = sign (µ− 1) (A.58)
When µ > 1, under flexible prices terms of trade are more volatile under complete markets.
Using a similar approach,
sign (var (c˜rt )− var (ĉ
r
t )) = sign [(1− 2α) (1 + ψ)λ
a − (λa − 2α) (1 + λcψ)] (A.59)
= sign [4 (1− µ)α (1− α) (1 + ψ + ψ (1− 2α+ 2 (µ− 1) (1− α)))](A.60)
thus, when µ > 1, var (c˜rt ) < var (ĉ
r
t ), and relative consumptions are less volatile under complete
markets under flexible prices. Lastly,
sign(var (y˜rt )− var (ŷ
r
t )) = sign
(
λc − 1
1 + λcψ
)
= sign (µ− 1) (A.61)
so relative outputs are more volatile under complete markets under flexible prices when µ > 1.
A.5 Equilibria under sticky prices
A.5.1 Complete markets
Under complete markets, we get the following dynamics of terms of trade
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 + κ (− (1 + λ
cψ) ŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) (A.62)
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where λc = (1− 2α)2 + 4µα (1− α), and where relative products and consumptions are
ŷrt = −λ
cŝt (A.63)
ĉrt = (2α− 1) ŝt (A.64)
Finally, using the expression of terms of trade under flexible prices and complete markets s˜t =
− 1+ψ1+λcψ â
r
t , we get
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 − ε (ŝt − s˜t) (A.65)
where ε = κ (1 + λcψ). Because this equation has a forward and a backward component, the
saddle path condition requires that the lag polynomial admits one root outside the unit circle
and one root inside. Rewriting this equation using the lag (L) and the lead (L−1) operator we
get
−Et
(
L−1
(
L2 − δcomL+ β
)
ŝt
)
= εs˜t (A.66)
where δcom = (1 + β + ε) . Let us focus on the determinant of the polynomial δ2com − 4β. First,
κ ≥ 0 and λc > 0 which means that ε = κ (1 + λcψ) ≥ 0. If ε is large, i.e. with low nominal
rigidities, it is clear that δ2com − 4β > 0. Second,
lim
ε→0
δ2com − 4β = 1 + β
2 − 2β = (1− β)
2
> 0 (A.67)
Therefore the polynomial always admits two roots:
λ1 =
δcom −
√
δ2com − 4β
2
, and λ2 =
δcom +
√
δ2com − 4β
2
(A.68)
We can further check that 0 < λ1 < 1 and that λ2 > 1. Remind that δcom > 0 and that, since
β > 0, δcom −
√
δ2com − 4β < 1 always, which means 0 < λ1 < 1. Finally, because
lim
ε→0
λ2 = 1, and lim
ε→∞
λ2 =∞, ∀0 < β < 1 (A.69)
and because λ2 is a continuous and strictly increasing function in both ε and β on their respective
domains, λ2 > 1 always. So the equation always delivers the following saddle path solution(
1−
L
λ2
)
ŝt =
1
λ2
Et
(
ε
(1− λ1L−1)
s˜t
)
(A.70)
or
ŝt = λ
−1
2
(
ŝt−1 + ε
∞∑
s=0
λs1Et (s˜t+s)
)
(A.71)
where, since λ1 < 1, we have used the fact that 11−λ1L−1 =
(
1 + λ1L
−1 + λ21L
−2 + ...+ λ∞1 L
−∞
)
.
Finally, substituting the values of λ2 and λ1 :
ŝt = ρ1,comŝt−1 + ερ1,com
∞∑
s=0
(ρ2,com)
s
Et (s˜t+s) (A.72)
where ρ1,com =
(
1
2
(
δcom +
√
δ2com − 4β
))
−1
and ρ2,com = 12
(
δcom −
√
δ2com − 4β
)
. As a function of
structural shocks, we get
ŝt = ρ1,comŝt−1 − κρ1,com (1 + ψ)
∞∑
s=0
(ρ2,com)
s
Et
(
ârt+s
)
(A.73)
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A.5.2 Autarky
Under autarky, the dynamics of terms of trade is
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 + κ (− (1 + ψ)λ
aŝt − (1 + ψ) â
r
t ) (A.74)
where λa = 1 + 2 (µ− 1) (1− α) and relative products and consumptions are
ŷrt = −λ
aŝt (A.75)
ĉrt = (1− 2µ (1− α)) ŝt (A.76)
Again, using the flexible prices expression of terms of trade, we get
∆ŝt = βEt∆ŝt+1 − ε (Φŝt − s˜t) (A.77)
where Φ = (1+ψ)λ
a
1+λcψ . Just as in the previous case, we can derive the analytical solution to this
equation
−Et
(
L−1
(
L2 − δL+ β
)
ŝt
)
= εs˜t (A.78)
where δaut = (1 + β + εΦ) . Let us focus on the determinant of the polynomial δ2aut − 4β. Now
because λa can be negative, Φ can also be negative and the analysis of the complete market case
would not carry over the case of financial autarky. The conditions to have λa > 0 are rather
loose, however, since λa > 0 as long as
µ >
1/2− α
1− α
,
which means that µ has to be higher than 1/2 for a closed economy and can be lower in the case
of higher trade openness. From now on, we assume µ > 1/2, which means that the polynomial
governing the dynamics of terms of trade under autarky always admits two roots, one outside
and one inside the unit circle. Now the solution of the terms-of-trade equation is
ŝt = ρ1,autŝt−1 − κρ1,aut (1 + ψ)
∞∑
s=0
(ρ2,aut)
s
Et
(
ârt+s
)
(A.79)
where ρ1,aut =
(
1
2
(
δaut +
√
δ2aut − 4β
))
−1
, and ρ2,aut = 12
(
δaut −
√
δ2aut − 4β
)
.
A.5.3 Variances
Proposition 2 When µ > 1, δaut > δcom which implies ρ1,aut < ρ1,com and ρ2,aut < ρ2,com.
Proof. In general, sign (δaut − δcom) = sign ((2 (1− α) + 2ψ (1− α) (1− 2α)) (µ− 1)) , which, be-
cause 0 < α < 1/2 implies sign (δaut − δcom) = sign (µ− 1).
Proposition 3 When µ > 1, terms of trade are more volatile under complete markets than under finan-
cial autarky, while they are less volatile when µ < 1.
Proof. Under rational expectations, Et
(
ârt+s
)
= ρaâ
r
t where ρa is the persistence of the produc-
tivity process, so that
ŝt = ρ1ŝt−1 − ϕâ
r
t (A.80)
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where ϕ = κρ1 (1 + ψ) / (1− ρ2ρa), which implies
var (ŝt) =
ϕ2
1− ρ21
1 + ρ1ρa
1− ρ1ρa
var (ârt ) (A.81)
This equation shows that ρ1 and ρ2 affect positively the variance of terms of trade. Using the
result of Proposition 2 gives the result.
Proposition 4 The variance of relative inflation rates is also higher under complete markets than under
autarky when µ > 1.
Proof. Using the solution of Equation (A.80) in difference also allows us to derive the analytical
expression of var (∆ŝt), that is of the variance of relative inflation rates
var (∆ŝt) =
ϕ22 (1− ρa)
1− ρ21
(
1− ρ1
1− ρ1ρa
)
var (ârt ) (A.82)
While the effect of ρ2 on the variance of ∆ŝt is unambiguously positive, the effect of ρ1 is less
clear. However, it can be shown that
sign
(
∂var (∆ŝt)
∂ρ1
)
= sign (2 (1− ρ1ρa)− ρ1 (1 + ρ1) (1− ρa)) > 0 (A.83)
as ρ1 (1 + ρ1) < 2 and (1− ρa) < (1− ρ1ρa) since ρ1 < 1. As both ρ1 and ρ2 affect positively the
volatility of relative inflation rates, the latter is higher under complete markets if µ > 1.
A.6 Analytical expression of welfare
We start with the difference between the variance of key welfare variables under complete markets
and autarky:
varaut (ĉ
r
t − c˜
r
t )− varcom (ĉ
r
t − c˜
r
t ) =
 (1− 2µ (1− α))2 ϕ2aut1−ρ21,aut 1+ρ1,autρa1−ρ1,autρa
− (2α− 1)
2 ϕ2com
1−ρ2
1,com
1+ρ1,comρa
1−ρ1,comρa
 var (ârt )
+ 2 (1− 2α)
1 + ψ
1 + λcψ
(
(1−2α)ϕcom
1−ρ1,comρa
− (2µ(1−α)−1)ϕaut1−ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
varaut (ŝt − s˜t)− varcom (ŝt − s˜t) =
(
ϕ2aut
1− ρ21,aut
1 + ρ1,autρa
1− ρ1,autρa
−
ϕ2com
1− ρ21,com
1 + ρ1,comρa
1− ρ1,comρa
)
var (ârt )
+ 2
1 + ψ
1 + λcψ
(
ϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
ϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
varaut (ŷ
r
t − y˜
r
t )− varcom (ŷ
r
t − y˜
r
t ) =
 (λa)2 ϕ2aut1−ρ21,aut 1+ρ1,autρa1−ρ1,autρa
− (λc)
2 ϕ2com
1−ρ2
1,com
1+ρ1,comρa
1−ρ1,comρa
 var (ârt )
+ 2
λc (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
(
λcϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
λaϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
varaut (∆ŝt)− varcom (∆ŝt) = 2 (1− ρa)
 1−ρ1,aut1−ρ1,autρa ϕ2aut1−ρ21,aut
−
1−ρ1,com
1−ρ1,comρa
ϕ2com
1−ρ2
1,com
 var (ârt )
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Now we can deduce that
W autt −W
com
t = − (1− 2µ (1− α))
2
varaut (ŝt)− (2α− 1)
2
varcom (ŝt)
−2 (1− 2α)
1 + ψ
1 + λcψ
(
(1− 2α)ϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
(2µ (1− α)− 1)ϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
−4µα (1− α) (varaut (ŝt)− varcom (ŝt))
−8µα (1− α)
(1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
(
ϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
ϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
−ψ
(
(λa)
2
varaut (ŝt)− (λ
c)
2
varcom (ŝt)
)
−2ψ
λc (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
(
λcϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
λaϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
var (ârt )
−2 (1− ρa) θκ
−1
(
(1− ρ1,aut)
(1 + ρ1,autρa)
varaut (ŝt)−
(1− ρ1,com)
(1 + ρ1,comρa)
varcom (ŝt)
)
(A.84)
or, simplifying further
W autt −W
com
t = Ξcomvarcom (ŝt)− Ξautvaraut (ŝt)− Ξaut,comvar (â
r
t ) (A.85)
where
Ξaut = (1− 2µ (1− α))
2
+ 4µα (1− α) + ψ (λa)
2
+ 2 (1− ρa) θκ
−1 (1− ρ1,aut)
(1 + ρ1,autρa)
(A.86)
Ξcom = (2α− 1)
2
+ 4µα (1− α) + ψ (λc)
2
+ 2 (1− ρa) θκ
−1 (1− ρ1,com)
(1 + ρ1,comρa)
(A.87)
Ξaut,com =
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + λcψ
[
(1− 2α)
(
(1− 2α)ϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
(2µ (1− α)− 1)ϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
+4µα (1− α)
(
ϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
ϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)
+ψλc
(
λcϕcom
1− ρ1,comρa
−
λaϕaut
1− ρ1,autρa
)]
(A.88)
Finally, using the expression of the variance of terms of trade under alternative financial market
structures
W autt −W
com
t = (Ξ
′
com − Ξ
′
aut − Ξaut,com) var (â
r
t ) (A.89)
where
Ξ′aut = Ξaut
ϕ2aut
1− ρ21,aut
1 + ρ1,autρa
1− ρ1,autρa
and Ξ′com = Ξcom
ϕ2com
1− ρ21,com
1 + ρ1,comρa
1− ρ1,comρa
(A.90)
A.7 The effects of persistence
Figure 4 reports the difference in welfare expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption
W = 100 (E (W autt )− E (W
com
t )) /(c+c
∗) as a function of persistence with a fixed Calvo parameter
(η = 0.75) and a fixed trade elasticity (µ = 1.5).
For intermediate to large values of persistence, the effects on nominal rigidities is stronger and
equilibria under complete markets deliver lower levels of welfare than equilibria under financial
autarky. Larger values of persistence, implying close-to-permanent shocks, magnify the allocation
effect and lead complete markets to produce higher levels of welfare.
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Figure 4: W as a function of the persistence of productivity shocks.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Persistence of productivity shocks (ρa)
1
0
0
(E
(W
a
u
t
t
)
−
E
(W
c
o
m
t
)/
(c
+
c∗
)
B The medium-scale model
B.1 Equilibrium conditions
B.1.1 Households
We carry over the two-country structure used in Appendix A, but extend the analysis by con-
sidering a unit-mass continuum of households in each country. Let us focus on the behavior of
household j in the domestic economy that maximizes its lifetime welfare
Et
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−tǫb,s
(
(cs (j)− hs (j))
1−σc
1− σc
− ǫn,s
ns (j)
1+ψ
1 + ψ
)}
, (B.1)
where ct (j) denotes consumption, ht (j) = hcct−1 (j) a stock of external consumption habits,
nt (j) the hours of work supplied and ǫb,t and ǫn,t respectively an intertemporal substitution and
a labor supply shock following autoregressive processes. The budget constraint of agent j is
rt,t+1bt (j) + pt (ct (j) + it (j)) = bt−1 (j) + (1− τ
w)wt (j)nt (j)
+
(
rkt zt (j)− ptac
z
t (j)
)
kt−1 (j) + ϕt (j)− taxt (B.2)
where bt (j) denotes the nominal value of a portfolio composed of Arrow–Debreu securities at
time t producing a state-contingent return rt,t+1 between period t and t+1. Further, pt is the price
index of consumption goods, ph,t the price index of goods produced in the domestic economy,
it (j) is the investment in physical capital, τw is the labor income tax rate, introduced to offset
monopolistic distortions on the labor market, wt (j) is the nominal wage paid to type-j labor, rkt is
the gross return on the capital stock, zt (j) is the utilization rate of capital, aczt (j) =
φz
2 (zt (j)− 1)
2
is a capital utilization adjustment cost, ϕt (j) denotes profits from monopolistic firms and taxt
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is a lump-sum tax. An additional constraint to this optimization problem is the law of capital
accumulation
kt (j) = (1− δ) kt−1 (j) + ǫi,t
(
1− acit (j)
)
it (j) (B.3)
where ǫi,t is an investment shock following an autoregressive process, and where
acit (j) =
φi
2
(
it (j)
it−1 (j)
− 1
)2
(B.4)
is an investment adjustment cost. The maximization of the welfare function subject to the
budget constraint with respect to consumption yields
βEt
(
rtuc,t+1 (j)
πt+1uc,t (j)
)
= 1 (B.5)
where πt = pt/pt−1, rt is the nominal return on risk-free one-period bonds, and uc,t (j) is the
marginal utility of consumption. Similar conditions hold for the foreign household, and the
structure of complete international asset markets yields
uc,t (j)
pt
=
uc∗,t (j)
p∗t
, ∀t (B.6)
Under our alternative financial market specification, financial markets are incomplete across
countries (but complete within countries) with quadratic portfolio adjustment costs (see Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe [2003]). As a consequence Euler equations under incomplete markets are
βEt
(
rt
1 + φbbrt
uc,t+1 (j)
πt+1uc,t (j)
)
= 1 (B.7)
βEt
(
rt
1− φ∗bb
r
t/rert
uc∗,t+1 (j)
π∗t+1uc∗,t (j)
)
= 1 (B.8)
where brt denotes the domestic real net foreign assets, assumed to be zero in the steady state, φb
controls the magnitude of portfolio costs and rert = p∗t /pt is the real exchange rate. We consider
a similar structure for consumption and investment goods. Keeping notations unchanged with
respect to Appendix A, we get the following domestic and foreign good demands
xh,t (j) = (1− α)
(
ph,t
pt
)
−µ
xt (j) , xf,t (j) = α
(
pf,t
pt
)
−µ
xt (j) (B.9)
x∗f,t (j) = (1− α)
(
pf,t
p∗t
)
−µ
x∗t (j) , x
∗
h,t (j) = α
(
ph,t
p∗t
)
−µ
x∗t (j) (B.10)
for x = {c, i, acz}, where ph,t and pf,t are the prices of goods produced respectively in the domestic
and in the foreign economy, and µ is the trade elasticity. The wage-setting equation is derived
using the aggregate labor bundle used by firms
nt (ω) =
(∫ 1
0
nt (j, ω)
θwt −1
θw
t dj
) θwt
θw
t
−1
with (θwt − 1)
−1
= (θwt − 1)
−1
+ σwξw,t (B.11)
where ξw,t is a wage mark-up shock, to derive optimal labor demands
nt (j, ω) =
(
wt (j)
wt
)
−θwt
nt (ω) (B.12)
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These labor demands are taken into account by monopolistic wage-setters in addition to their
budget constraint when solving their optimization program. Further, we assume sticky wages
whereby wage-setters face an individual probability 1 − ηw to be allowed to re-optimize and a
probability ηw to index their previous period wage on lagged CPI inflation, where γw is the
degree of wage indexation. The corresponding optimal wage wt (j) is20
∞∑
i=0
(βηw)
i
Et
(
nt+i (j)
(
θwt+i
θwt+i − 1
un,t+i
uc,t+i
+ (1− τw)
wt (j)
pt+i
(
pt+i−1
pt−1
)γw))
= 0 (B.14)
and the dynamics of wages is
w
1−θwt
t = η
w
(
wt−1π
γw
t−1
)1−θwt
+ (1− ηw)wt (j)
1−θwt (B.15)
From now on we assume perfect risk-sharing among households of the domestic economy. House-
holds j are thus identical and we drop the j indices. Defining qtptλt as the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the capital accumulation constraint, first-order conditions with respect to the
capital stock, investment, and the utilization rate, are respectively
βEt
(
uc,t+1
uc,t
(
qt+1 (1− δ) +
(
rkt+1
pt+1
zt+1 −
φz
2
(zt+1 − 1)
2
)))
= qt (B.16)
qtǫi,t
(
1−
φi
2
d2t − φidt (1 + dt)
)
+ βEt
(
uc,t+1
uc,t
qt+1ǫi,t+1φidt+1 (1 + dt+1)
2
)
= 1 (B.17)
rkt
pt
− φz (zt − 1) = 0 (B.18)
where dt =
it
it−1
− 1.
B.1.2 Firms
There is a continuum of final good producers indexed in ω in each country, with the following
production function
yt (ω) = ǫa,tk
s
t (ω)
ι
ℓt (ω)
1−ι
(B.19)
where kst is a measure of capital services used in production and ǫa,t is a productivity measure
following an autoregressive process. Cost minimization implies
kst (ω) =
ι
1− ι
wt
rkt
ℓt (ω) (B.20)
which can be used to derive an expression of the nominal marginal cost
mct (ω) = mct = (ǫa,t)
−1 (
rkt
)ι
(wt)
1−ι
ι−ι (1− ι)
−(1−ι)
(B.21)
20A similar condition holds for foreign households:
∞∑
i=0
(βηw∗)
i
Et
(
n∗t+i (j)
(
θw∗t+i
θw∗t+i − 1
un∗,t+i
uc∗,t+i
+ (1− τw)
w
∗
t (j)
p∗t+i
(
p∗t+i−1
p∗t−1
)γw∗))
= 0 (B.13)
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The adjustment of production prices is also subject to Calvo contracts with partial indexation.
Re-setters face the following problem
max
ph,t(ω)
∞∑
i=0
(βηp)
i
Et
(
uc,t+i
uc,t
pt
pt+i
(
(1− τp) ph,t (ω)
(
ph,t+i−1
ph,t−1
)γp
yt+i (ω)−mct+iyt+i (ω)
))
(B.22)
where τp is the tax rate on sales, taking into account the demand addressed to firm ω
yt (ω) =
(
ph,t (ω)
ph,t
)
−θ
p
t
yt (B.23)
where the mark-up evolves according to
(θpt − 1)
−1
= (θp − 1)
−1
+ σpξp,t (B.24)
The optimal pricing condition is thus
∞∑
i=0
(βηp)
i
Et
(
uc,t+i
pt+i
yt+i (ω)
(
(1− τp) ph,t (ω)
(
ph,t+i−1
ph,t−1
)γp
−
θpt+i
θpt+i − 1
mct+i
))
= 0 (B.25)
while the dynamics of prices is given by
p
1−θpt
h,t = η
p
(
ph,t−1π
γp
h,t−1
)1−θpt
+ (1− ηp) ph,t (ω)
1−θpt (B.26)
B.1.3 Monetary policy, government and aggregation
As in Smets and Wouters [2003], it is assumed that the central bank of the monetary union
commits to the following interest rate rule
rt
r
=
(rt−1
r
)dr (( πut
ǫpi,t
)dpi (yut
y˜ut
)dy)1−dr ( πut
πut−1
)d∆pi (yut /yut−1
y˜ut /y˜
u
t−1
)d∆y
exp (σrξr,t) (B.27)
where πut is the union-wide inflation rate, y
u
t is the union-wide output, y˜
u
t its flexible prices
counterpart and ǫpi,t and ξr,t respectively an inflation-target and a monetary policy shock. Gov-
ernment budget constraints are
taxt + τ
p
∫ 1
0
ph,t (ω) yt (ω) + τ
w
∫ 1
0
wt (j)nt (j) = gt (B.28)
tax∗t + τ
p∗
∫ 1
0
pf,t (ω) y
∗
t (ω) + τ
w∗
∫ 1
0
w∗t (j)n
∗
t (j) = g
∗
t (B.29)
where gt = gǫg,t and g∗t = g
∗ǫ∗g,t and ǫg,t and ǫ
∗
g,t follow autoregressive processes. Equilibrium in
the labor markets implies
ℓt =
∫ 1
0
ℓt (ω) dω =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
nt (j, ω) djdω = Υ
w
t nt (B.30)
ℓ∗t =
∫ 1
0
ℓ∗t (ω) dω =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
n∗t (j, ω) djdω = Υ
w∗
t n
∗
t (B.31)
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where Υwt =
∫ 1
0
(
wt(j)
wt
)
−θwt
dj and Υw∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
w∗t (j)
w∗t
)
−θw∗t
dj denote the dispersion of wages. Equi-
librium in the physical capital market gives
kst =
∫ 1
0
kst (ω) dω =
∫ 1
0
zt (j) kt−1 (j) dj = ztkt−1 (B.32)
ks∗t =
∫ 1
0
ks∗t (ω) dω =
∫ 1
0
z∗t (j) k
∗
t−1 (j) dj = z
∗
t k
∗
t−1 (B.33)
while equilibrium in goods markets yields
yt = (1− α)
(
ph,t
pt
)
−µ
(ct + it + ac
z
t kt−1) + α
(
ph,t
p∗t
)
−µ (
c∗t + i
∗
t + ac
z∗
t k
∗
t−1
)
+ gt (B.34)
y∗t = (1− α)
(
pf,t
p∗t
)
−µ (
c∗t + i
∗
t + ac
z∗
t k
∗
t−1
)
+ α
(
pf,t
pt
)
−µ
(ct + it + ac
z
t kt−1) + g
∗
t (B.35)
Finally, using other aggregate conditions, aggregate production functions are
Υpt yt = ǫa,t (ztkt−1)
ι
(Υwt nt)
1−ι
(B.36)
Υp∗t y
∗
t = ǫ
∗
a,t
(
z∗t k
∗
t−1
)ι∗
(Υw∗t n
∗
t )
1−ι∗
(B.37)
where Υpt =
∫ 1
0
(
ph,t(ω)
ph,t
)
−θ
p
t
dω and Υp∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
pf,t(ω)
pf,t
)
−θ
p∗
t
dω denote the dispersion of producer
prices.
B.2 Steady state
We analyze the dynamics of the model around a symmetric steady state implying s = rer = 1,
as well as br = 0. Therefore equilibria under alternative financial market structures share the
same steady state. Further, in the steady state, by definition, d = 0, and the dynamics of q gives
q = 1. The condition on the utilization rate thus gives
rk = φz (z − 1) (B.38)
which plugged in the investment equation pins down z
z =
√
1 +
2 (β−1 + δ − 1)
φz
(B.39)
as well as rk. Next use the real marginal cost to get the real wage w
w =
(
(θp − 1) (1− τp)
θp
ιι (1− ι)
(1−ι) (
rk
)−ι) 11−ι
(B.40)
Further, use
k =
ι
1− ι
w
rk
n
z
(B.41)
and the aggregate production function
y = (zk)
ι
n1−ι (B.42)
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to express the goods market clearing condition as a function of hours and consumption only
Ψn = c (B.43)
where Ψ = (1− ̺)
(
ι
1−ι
w
rkz
)ι
− (δ + acz) ι1−ι
w
rkz
, and where ̺ = g/y is the steady-state share of
public expenditure in GDP. We finally constrain ǫn to get n = 1, which gives
c = Ψ (B.44)
and pins down consumption, as well as all remaining variables. Using the wage equation, the
constraint on ǫn writes
ǫn =
(θw − 1) (1− τw)
θw
w
((1− hc) c)
σc (B.45)
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B.3 Parameter values
Table 3: Parameter values
Discount factor β = 0.99
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity ψ = 1.265
Habit in consumption hc = 0.551
Risk-aversion σc = 1.613
Trade openness α = 0.2
Trade elasticity µ = 1.5
Share of public expenditure in GDP ̺ = 0.22
Capital depreciation δ = 0.025
Investment adjustment cost φi = 6.048
Utilization adjustment cost φz = 0.175
Capital share ι = 0.3
Steady–state wage mark-up (θw − 1)
−1
= 0.5
Steady–state price mark-up (θw − 1)
−1
= 0.5
Calvo parameter (wages) ηw = 0.756
Calvo parameter (prices) ηp = 0.909
Indexation (wages) γw = 0.655
Indexation (prices) γp = 0.429
MP response to lagged interest rate dr = 0.928
MP response to inflation dpi = 1.668
MP response to inflation growth ∆π = 0.222
MP response to output gap dy = 0.144
MP response to output gap growth d∆y = 0.174
Pers. of preference shock ρb = 0.882
Pers. of investment shock ρi = 0.914
Pers. of labor supply shock ρn = 0.952
Pers. of productivity shock ρa = 0.822
Pers. of public spending shock ρg = 0.952
Pers. of inflation target shock ρpi = 0.847
Sd of preference shock σb = 0.324
Sd of investment shock σi = 0.14
Sd of labor supply shock σn = 1.709
Sd of productivity shock σa = 0.628
Sd of public spending shock σg = 0.331
Sd of inflation target shock σpi = 0.028
Sd of wage mark-up shock σw = 0.286
Sd of price mark-up shock σp = 0.163
Sd of monetary policy shock σr = 0.129
43
B.4 Variance decomposition
Table 4 presents the variance decomposition of key variables in model III after removing the
share of variance explained by monetary and inflation target shocks, as the latter do not affect
relative variables and have symmetric effects on both countries.
Table 4: Variance decomposition of the medium-scale model in model
III (no capital, no consumption habits, no indexation)
All shocks No Preference shocks
Prod. Pref. Pub. Mk-up Prod. Pref. Pub. Mk-up
Complete markets Complete markets
yt 4.23 94.37 1.39 0.00 75.20 – 24.78 0.02
ct 4.61 95.13 0.26 0.00 94.61 – 5.36 0.03
nt 27.31 71.63 1.06 0.00 96.27 – 3.73 0.00
πi,t 16.83 82.93 0.23 0.01 98.59 – 1.36 0.04
st 3.72 96.00 0.28 0.00 93.09 – 6.91 0.01
Wt 1.78 97.36 0.87 0.00 67.21 – 32.79 0.00
Incomplete markets Incomplete markets
yt 4.68 93.74 1.57 0.00 74.83 – 25.16 0.02
ct 4.38 95.36 0.27 0.00 94.22 – 5.75 0.03
nt 29.32 69.51 1.17 0.00 96.17 – 3.83 0.00
πi,t 18.34 81.43 0.23 0.01 98.72 – 1.23 0.05
st 5.31 94.42 0.27 0.00 95.15 – 4.85 0.01
Wt 1.17 97.36 0.87 0.00 67.21 – 32.79 0.00
The contribution of monetary policy and inflation target shocks has been removed. The
contribution of investment shocks is null given the absence of capital accumulation in
model III.
44
